Abstract

Thirty years on, Fukuyama’s claim regarding the end of history serves mostly as an object of derision, not inspiration. However, contained within Fukuyama’s assertions are observations that provide valuable insight into the condition of contemporary liberal democracy worldwide. In this essay I highlight core features of liberal democracy celebrated by Fukuyama that have been marginalized owing to the imperatives of neoliberal globalization. I explore three features of Fukuyama’s “End of History” argument that can help explain the rise of populism and nationalism within liberal democratic systems. With the proliferation of materialist incentives throughout the liberal democratic world, Fukuyama’s largely unheralded observations concerning materialism, consciousness, and what I call deliberative norms, are ripe for interrogation. Usually not prominent in discussions of Fukuyama’s 1989 article are key principles of liberal democracy, central norms which I consider “orphans at the end of history.” I locate dissatisfaction with neoliberal globalization in the penetration of materialist incentives into the construction of identity, the process of higher education, and the role of societal elites. I address the degree to which the promotion of liberal deliberative norms in the debate over ideas and culture was replaced by a materialist ethos that alienates and divides, to such an extent that despite Fukuyama’s optimism, history has returned.