Abstract

Using an award-winning comedy duo of artificial intelligence agents as a case study, this paper argues for a reappraisal of the human/non-human dichotomy. Henri Bergson’s 1911 essay, titled “Laughter, an essay on the meaning of the comic,” provides a fundamental theoretical proposition for comedy. He suggested a “new law” of comedy: “We laugh every time a person gives us the impression of being a thing”. This paper asks: will Bergson’s “new law” stand if it is inverted? Will we laugh every time a thing gives us the impression of being a person? Central to Bergson’s proposition is the idea that there is an incongruity between the “human” and the “non-human.” Incongruity, with or without resolution, has been seen as a cornerstone concept in many humour theories. Through the case study, this paper examines the perceived binary opposition of “human” and “non-human.” Is there an incongruity between the “human” and “non-human” agents employed in this project? And, if so, does this incongruity need to be resolved to generate humorous effect, or does this incongruity resist resolution?