Abstract
Recent research studying the French experiment of the Citizen Convention for Climate (2020) have suggested that without genuine power over the decision process, the epistemic value of democratic deliberation decreases and the ethical demands of adaptation policies tend to be overshadowed by a technical framing. Without displaying the entirety of the rationale that support this claim, in this paper I give some avenues for reflection on the way different interpretations of “adaptation” as a form of public policy can lead to various outcomes regarding both the ethical and political dimensions of climate governance. For this purpose I will rely on some of the empirical data provided by the French Convention. The problem can be put as follow: most of the adaptation mechanisms adopted in climate governance are targeting “vulnerable populations” in order to ensure social and economic resilience. However, we know that the most vulnerable are also the less able to meet the adaptation requirements at an individual level. How then guarantee that adaptation policies do not backfire on those they were meant to help in the first place? My point is that the philosophical background adopted by policymakers to define adaptation does impact the success of adaptation policies in observing climate justice criteria. Here I confront two interpretations of “adaptation”: the neo-liberal evolutionist’s and the naturalistic pragmatist’s. I hen show that the former, which is also the most prevalent in current policy framework, tends to foster technical approaches and impair democratic practices of decision-making.
Presenters
Wüthrich ZéliePhD Student, Philosophy, Université Paris-Est Créteil, Val-de-Marne, France
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
CLIMATE CHANGE, ADAPTATION POLICY, PRAGMATISM, VULNERABILITY, CITIZEN PARTICIPATION, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY
