Abstract
This paper examines the impact of government regulation in the media market. In a duopolistic market structure, the intervention of a state-owned media firm without bias will reduce the price of the print version of a newspaper but will increase its digital subscription fee. Moreover, the government regulation by introducing a third public media outlet without bias will not necessarily reduce the media slanting. The User-generated Content of a digital version of a newspaper, along with the media bias from both the supply-side and the demand-side, makes this kind of government regulation much less effective. However, other regulatory policies such as price regulation and tax can decrease the level of slanting, especially the tax policy, which leads to an average level of slanting even less than the socially optimal level.
Presenters
Jun HuPhD Student, Research Center in Economics and Law , University of Paris II Panthéon-Assas, Paris, France
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
SOCIAL MEDIA, MEDIA BIAS, SPATIAL MODEL, GOVERNMENT REGULATION
