Religion in China: An Economic Approach

Abstract

This paper is an interpretation of the regulation of religions in China as a form of industrial organization, with the relationship of Chinese regulation of the five legal religions as either a regulated monopoly or an oligopoly. It analogizes the legal relationship between the Chinese government and the five legal religions with the legal status of Chinese state-owned enterprises as the laws governing social organizations including religious organizations, much like the laws governing state-owned enterprises are important incentives the influence the behavior of groups as a whole. The behavior of religious groups will be discussed through economic language interpreting the relationship to be wither reflective of a regulated monopoly where the relationship is likely to focus on a religion’s monopoly over a group of adherents with little competition, as well as an oligopoly, where some, limited forms of competition between the religions exist. This type of oligopolistic competition for government benefits is known as “rent-seeking.” This paper also explores the illegal and nonlegal religious movements, arguing that these underground religious groups form a sort of “informal religious economy” given the structural constraints placed on these religious groups.

Presenters

Aaron Walayat

Details

Presentation Type

Paper Presentation in a Themed Session

Theme

The Politics of Religion

KEYWORDS

China, Religion, Informal, Economy, Rational, Choice, Industrial, Organization, Law,

Digital Media

This presenter hasn’t added media.
Request media and follow this presentation.