Abstract
The Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (commonly called the NPT RevCon) failed to produce a consensus document. Among the points of contention that doomed the outcome document, this paper focuses on four: the meaning of a “moratorium” on fissile material, disagreement on whether security is necessary for disarmament or nuclear disarmament is necessary for security, legal obligations vs. political commitments, and disarmament vs. arms reduction. By drawing on history, international relations theory, and practical considerations related to treaty verification, this paper argues that “moratorium” is a meaningful and actionable term, that arms reduction must precede disarmament, and, crucially, that both sides of the “security first” and “disarmament first” debate are correct in their convictions but at different times in the disarmament process because there is an inflection point when “disarmament first” must give way to “security first” in order to move from arms reduction to disarmament; furthermore, political commitments are necessary conditions without which the transition point cannot be crossed. The paper concludes with a policy recommendation outlining how the NPT nuclear-weapons states, and other nuclear weapons states outside the treaty framework, can safely and securely meet their Article IV responsibilities.
Presenters
Brian MuzasAssistant Professor and Director, the Center for United Nations and Global Governance Studies, School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University, New Jersey, United States
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
NPT, Nuclear Disarmament, Arms Control, Arms Reduction, Trust, Verification
