Abstract
How useful is judicial hierarchy in correcting errors made by lower-level courts in their judicial decisions? This paper applies organizational knowledge to analyse judicial hierarchies by evaluating the economics of the correction of legal errors. The method used is a multidisciplinary analysis drawing upon law, economics and management. The importance—social, political and economic— of judges dispensing justice correctly is fundamental; it enhances coherence, efficiency, uniformity and foreseeability. I show that judicial hierarchies have a mixed result in correcting errors made by lower-level courts. In coming to this conclusion, this paper applies the work of Ronald Coase to judicial hierarchies to show that the current degree of knowledge resembles the fog of ignorance that surrounded the firm before 1937. I examine the following factors: the complexities of error in law, the tension between individual and social optimality, the judicial process as a quasi-market, market failures and hierarchical solutions, market failures of hierarchies, competition as an alternative method to correcting hierarchical errors. While law can show what errors are made or exist, organizationally speaking, lawyers qua lawyers cannot say how error correction can be improved. Nor can management as the judiciary is a fundamentally different type of organization. However, economics has the tools to evaluate hierarchies. I draw upon examples from the United Kingdom and France to compare the results and to provide reasons for the differences in results considering the analytical factors that we have identified.
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
Law, Economics, Organizations, Judges, Hierarchy
