Abstract
Human propensity to represent facts and their interaction with relevant elements of the physical and social environment around them using structured narratives is well documented in cognitive and social psychology. It seems likely that narrative thinking is a human universal embodied in the architecture of our brains affecting perception, memory, language, etc., and therefore demands an evolutionary explanation. Since narrative thinking distorts the formation of rational inferences based on evidence and assign roles, intentions and an stable moral character to specific agents or categories without acknowledging complex effects, it must lead to systematic biases and errors in decision-making. In this work I introduce a mathematical model to account for the functionality and adaptive value of narrative thinking. I consider a very simple type of narrative template that can be applied to different contexts, including competing political ideologies and cooperative personal relations and assume incomplete information about types of agents. Information that is used to assign roles in the template comes from observed behavior that contributes to the formation of beliefs that are confirmed in equilibrium. Depending on parameters, different equilibria are possible that require some coordination of actions and beliefs and some of them turn out to be inefficient. Political polarization phenomena can be explained using the results and a possible way to test the theory is also provided.
Presenters
Juan Perote PeñaProfesor Titular de Universidad, Economic Analysis, University of Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
Game theory, Asymmetric information, Evolution, Rational decision-making
