Fourteenth International Conference on Interdisciplinary Social Sciences

Abstract

How does the alliance between a client state and its nuclear ally influence support for proliferation in the client state? The literature primarily looks at one mechanism through which nuclear allies have often tried to reassure client states—nuclear security guarantees. A crucial characteristic of these guarantees is their credibility. The commonly accepted theory linking nuclear security guarantees to the risk of proliferation is the “credibility hypothesis,” which posits that support for nuclear weapons acquisition is low when a nuclear security guarantee’s credibility is high and vice versa. However, this paper offers a new theoretical approach. I posit that, under conditions of highly credible nuclear security guarantees, support for nuclear weapons acquisition should actually increase. This is because, as the credibility of a nuclear security guarantee increases, individuals become more concerned about unjustified or unfair use of nuclear weapons by their ally. This leads individuals in the client state support nuclear weapons acquisition in order to regain control over their nuclear fate. To adjudicate between these two interpretations, this project designs and analyzes a survey experiment among a representative sample of adults in South Korea in order to assess how the perceived credibility of a security guarantee from a nuclear-armed ally (in this case, the United States) influences public preferences about proliferation. Ultimately, this paper finds support for the unwanted use hypothesis, identifying a treatment effect whereby high-credibility nuclear security guarantees increase support for proliferation. These findings challenge the consensus of the credibility hypothesis’ approach to nonproliferation strategies by nuclear-armed states.