Abstract
Two prominent epistemological approaches in social science are positivism and social constructionism. Social constructionism symbolizes the primacy of the social against the individualist hegemony of an objectivist and universalist science steeped in empiricism. Apparently, the constructionist epistemological interests are local and fundamentally opposes positivism’s global tendencies. This paper argues that both approaches are mistaken and would not be able to solve local-global polarities and aspirations. After a brief critical look at the critical realism of Bhaskar who strived to move beyond this dualism with an explicit naturalist ontology, this paper proposes a naturalist realist ontology and epistemology. Naturalist realism provides the proper grounding for a theory of science for social science (and psychology) by clarifying what science is, what social and psychological reality involves, and how epistemic access is facilitated. In essence, the basis of a naturalist realism is critical difference, ontologically grounded and the paper indicates how this understanding allows a movement beyond the local-global tendencies of positivism and constructionism.
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