Abstract
In this paper two concepts of so-called “procedural justice“ are analyzed. First, tbe concept of “rectification“ that has been developed by Robert Nozick. Rectification is a consequence of “perfect“ procedural justice. Perfect procedural justice is a concept that: fundamental tenets of society must be accepted in original position, as form of the social contract or the constitution. After that, future (“historical“) shape of society, including all differences between people, are defined by historical, social, personal etc. “lottery“. Any results are “fair“ if rules have been respected by players. Players are “entitled“ by the rules. Nozick call this concept of justice entitlement theory. This is “pure” procedural justice because the whole legitimacy comes from the procedures or rules. The problem is: what we can do with results that come as a result of previous unjust action? Nozick concluded that we need some principle for leveling of the consequences of such historical unjust acts. He called it principle of rectification. The difference principle is the result of “imperfect” procedural justice: request for incorporating the mechanism of equalizing into the basic principles. It is still “procedural” justice – any future situation will be defined by the accepted procedures [rules, legal order]. But, in the social contract, we create procedures that tend in direction of equalisation. Our basic hypothesis in this paper is: both conceptions are incorrect in strict sense. Rectification is empirically impossible as a real option; the difference principle is in contradiction with the basic [“natural“] rights.
Presenters
Aleksandar SavanovićAssociate Professor, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
Civic, Political, and Community Studies
KEYWORDS
THE NATURL RIGHTS, RECTIFICATION, NOZICK, RAWLS
