Abstract
This research asks why intellectual property (IP)-importing states were strongly opposed to Data Exclusivity (DE) provisions for pharmaceuticals and biologics but only weakly opposed to the same clause for agrochemicals in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiation. By combining the two-level game logic and theories on transnational networks in its analytical framework, this research explores how actors within two distinct transnational networks – one comprising business actors in favour of DE provisions and the other comprising NGOs and activists against this IP clause – influenced the policy position of negotiating States. It argues that how such issues are framed by transnational networks can change the configuration of domestic preferences and, thus, the negotiating position of states. Frames can enhance or weaken the domestic legitimacy of the issue in question and therefore affects the policy position of States by constraining or expanding their negotiating win-sets. Case-studies on two IP-importing states - Malaysia and New Zealand - are conducted using the method of process tracing to determine the causal mechanism that led to their policy position in the negotiation. Preliminary findings suggest that changing domestic preferences affected policy position of States. Strong framing by a key domestic industry association for multinational corporations that produce agrochemicals weakenined the initial domestic opposition to DE, whereas stronger framing by anti-DE pharmaceutical networks led to Malaysia proposing for the suspension of pharmaceutical provisions in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP).
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
TPP, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NEGOTIATION, PROCESS TRACING, TWO-LEVEL GAME, NON-STATE ACTORS
