Twelfth Global Studies Conference

Abstract

Nuclear weapons proliferation stands as a foremost concern of the international community and a leading topic in International Relations. Efforts to persuade states to relinquish nuclear arsenals and/or abandon plans to acquire often seems a hopeless quest. Yet more states have forsaken their nuclear arsenals or plans than currently possess them. This study employs a case-study approach involving these former nuclear states to attempt to reveal the causal elements of denuclearization. The focus of this study will be on external system-level variables; that is measures applied by external actors. More specifically, this study will leverage theory and empirical data to analyze the conditions under which economic sanctions and incentives strategies are likely to succeed in countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The thesis of the study posits that economic statecraft measures are most likely to work when: 1) sanctions campaigns enjoy broad multilateral support from key trading partners and aid donors of the target state; 2) sanctions are not merely signaling exercises, but impose substantial material costs; 3) sanctions are coupled with economic incentives; 4) the nuclear weapons programs of the target state is in the inchoate stages; and (perhaps most importantly) 5) the target state must not face a nuclear armed regional adversary with whom it has engaged in a militarized dispute. This paper will discuss the theoretical underpinnings of these hypotheses, and apply empirical data to test the thesis.