About the Nepal Red Cross Society (NRCS)

NRCS came into being in 1963. It was recognized by the ICRC in 1964 and affiliated to the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in the same year. NRCS has, over the years, grown to be the largest humanitarian organization in Nepal, with its network of District Chapters (DCs) extended in each of the 75 districts of the country. District Chapters receive organizational support from more than 800 Sub-Chapters and Co-operation Committees under them. A significant portion of its activities are also borne by students and youth volunteers of Nepal Junior and Youth Red Cross Circles organized at schools, campuses and communities.

An earthquake hit Nepal just before noon on Saturday April 25, 2015 in the area near Barpak, in the northern part of the Gorkha district, a mountain village between capital Kathmandu and tourist town Pokhara. Distance from Kathmandu is 81km by air and 184km on roads. The earthquake with a magnitude of 7.8 was followed by many aftershocks and a very powerful aftershock of 6.7 hit on April 26. The quake was followed by more than 430 aftershocks and another earthquake, magnitude of 6.8, on May 12. The earthquakes resulted in tremendous damage to buildings and infrastructure in certain districts in Nepal. Roads, schools, power plants, heritage sites and private houses throughout the affected zone suffered extensive damage. Landslides occurred and blocked roads in the rural areas. An estimated total of 8,000 deaths and nearly 22,000 injured. It was the worst natural disaster to strike Nepal since the 1934 Nepal–Bihar earthquake.

Political tension

The political situation in Nepal was tense in 2015. Political parties and organizations were trying to position themselves for the coming constitution, which came into effect on September 20, 2015. During the emergency response period, protests and demonstrations were ongoing issues especially in the capital Kathmandu. Curfew was put in place for short periods, which restricted people’s movements and hereby affected Red Cross’s plans and postponed activities.

Incoming FACT and ERU

​Shortly after the first earthquake IFRC was ready to deploy FACT and ERU within Field Coordination, Civil and Military Coordination, Basic Health Care, Rapid Deployment Hospital, Water and Sanitation, Shelter, Relief, Cash Transfer Program, Logistics, IT/Telecom, Information Management, Communication, Restoring Family Links, Forensics as well as Planning, Monitoring, Evaluation and Reporting (PMER).

HQ for the operation was established in Kathmandu at a hotel next to NRCS's HQ. Partner National Societies (PNS), who were already in Nepal before the earthquake, had offices at NRCS's HQ.

Shortly after my arrival in Nepal, I was introduced to NRCS's logistics managers. It was not because, I had to work very much with them, but mostly to meet and give each other an understanding, that we were working towards a common goal. That's why, I also visited the Danish Country Coordinator to tell him, that I was in the country.

FACT and ERU were brought to the affected District Chapters for helping the NRCS with assessments and for running programs.

The Logistics ERU had several issues with access to affected areas.

1. Risk of another earthquake and powerful aftershocks as well as heavy rain causing landslides, roadblocks, damage to private houses, bridges, roads, schools and power plants.

2. Political tension causing demonstrations, protests and curfew.

The area, where the IFRC's Kathmandu warehouse was located, was designated as a gathering place in case of further earthquakes, which became necessary on May 12.

Logistics setup

The Logistics ERU (Danish, Finnish and Swiss) had two main warehouses, one near the HQ in Kathmandu and one in Bharatpur, Chitwan District. Beside those we had remote warehouse facilities in the most affected districts to mitigate roadblocks caused by natural issues (landslides, aftershocks, bridge collapse) or human issues (demonstrations, protests, curfew). They were located in:

• Charikot, Dolakha District.
• Chautara, Sindhupalchok District.
• Bidur, Nuwakot District.

From the beginning of the operation local nepalese staff was recruited to assist the international logistics delegates. The purpose was to use persons with local knowledge as language skills, private and professional network and cultural awareness to make the coordination and communication as smooth as possible. At the same time we could train locals how to deal with the four main logistics elements warehouse management, transportation management, procurement and custom clearance. It was part of the exit strategy that these persons should take over logistics tasks when the ERU left Nepal.

The Logistics ERU office in Kathmandu was located at NCRS's HQ.

Logistics Cluster

​FACT Logistics or/and ERU Logistics attended Logistics Cluster meetings hosted by World Food Programme (WFP). The WFP were running warehouses and could arrange transportation free of charge. The warehouses in Bidur, Nuwakot and Chautara, Sindhupalchok, which we used, were two of WFP's warehouses. At field level the Logistics Cluster organised and chaired coordination meetings to streamline activities, avoid duplication of efforts and ensure the optimal use of resources.

Interface between Relief and Logistics

The decision on beneficiary numbers and which items were to be distributed were ultimately made by Head of Emergency Operations (HeOps), FACT and the NRCS. It was all coordinated through the cluster, where the Napalese government had representatives.

A Relief & Logistics Interface Delegate (British) was located at the Logistics ERU office in Kathmandu. The main task for this delegate was to coordinate distribution plans with NRCS, Relief ERU and Logistics ERU.

Early in the operation fixed amount of beneficiaries to receive NFRI and WASH per district were agreed on. Each District Chapter had to find exactly the agreed amount of beneficiaries. Some District Chapters came back with beneficiary lists with too many names, which we had to reject.

Most of the supplies came through India via the port in Kolkata. Due to custom clearance procedures and monsoon in India a huge amount of the containers were delayed causing changes to the distribution plans. It was immensely difficult to get solid information from transport providers and custom brokers, about when to expect the supplies to arrive at our warehouses. This made the coordination and communication with NRCS and Relief RDRT & ERU even more important. Rough plans had to be finalized few days before a distribution should take place. I believe that this made the work in the communities fairly complex for the NRCS and Relief team.

During my two-day stay at the Dolahka district, from which the picture below was taken, I met NRCS employees and management at their Charikot office and the distribution point. We talked about their challenges and work as well as how recipients were identified and registered. From my point of view, I can only assume that the NRCS helped and cooperated with the entire local community in the individual districts. I am not aware of any problems that minority groups, or people with a political conviction other than the government, were not granted emergency aid. 

My role

I, Mikkel Faursby, was deployed from June 3 to August 31, 2015 as Logistics Delegate with responsibility for transportation management of non-food-relief-items (NFRI), water & sanitation & hygiene items (WASH) as well as ERU equipment.

The NFRI and WASH for beneficiaries were delivered to distribution points and District Chapter and Sub Chapter warehouses. The road transports took place mainly in the central districts with few shipments to the eastern and western districts outside the most affected areas. I did not have direct contact with the communities. My contact with the communities was through coordination and meetings with NCRS staff and RDRT & ERU relief delegates in relation to distribution plans. Furthermore I had talks with local transport service providers and RDRT & ERU delegates about road condition and risks of landslides caused by aftershocks and heavy rain.

Throughout my stay in Nepal, I had a local assistant, he talked with people from transport companies and their drivers to check the status of ordered trucks. Likewise, he helped me with information from NRCS employees about road conditions and delivery conditions in the rural areas. I chose this approach to avoid language misunderstandings and to get as realistic information as possible. The advantage was that the assistant knew the people in the transport industry personally, and therefore he could get more accurate and truthful information, than I could. It was also important for me to get an understanding of the concept of time in a local perspective. For example, "the truck has arrived" meant, that it could be expected to arrive within 30 minutes. Similarly, "the truck will be there in 1-2 hours" meant that there was trouble getting the truck to the destination, and that the truck could be expected to arrive later today.

We experienced issues with getting trucks on requested time due to restriction of trucks to enter the city ring in Kathmandu. It took me too long to realize the cause of the issue. The issue got solved, when I wrote and signed a statement, that the truck with this letter was involved in Red Cross' distribution of relief items to survivors & beneficiaries after the earthquake.

Airport and Customs clearence

The amount of relief supplies and equipment, that was sent to Kathmandu Airport, was very high until the beginning of June. It gave challenges to getting the most necessary equipment and supplies into the country and through customs clearance. During that period, two logistics delegates and three nepalese assistants were placed in an office at the airport. Their task consisted in coordinating the receipt of shipments from various Red Cross Societies and IFRC warehouses with the Regional Logistics Unit (IFRC, Kuala Lumpur). In this connection, they establish cooperation with airport staff including the Customs Clearance Authority and the Logistics Cluster. They were supported by NRCS staff at the NRCS HQ.

Agreements were made with the government of Nepal to facilitate speedy customs clearence processing. In this process, it helps, that NRCS has legal status agreement to operate in Nepal. A legal status should make the working relationship among the partners to the agreement more effective and efficient. Even then, it took long time to get documents approved and shipments cleared.

Roadblocks

One of my first tasks was to transport equipment for a Health ERU from Kathmandu to the Dolakha District. The Health team was to operate from temporary and local clinics as well as mobile medical team in the district. Shortly after they arrival to Dolakha, it was clear, that they needed to get a Toyota Land Cruiser 4WD from the Logistics ERU, to be able to reach remote villages. They were facing numerous issues with damaged roads caused by landslides, aftershocks and heavy rain, which made their work dreadful. Working and camping under these circumstances made it almost impossible for the team to run a safe operation.

Road access to Rasuwa District kept on been a huge issue for personnel and trucks with relief items. Helicopter transportations via United Nations Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) were arranged, but were only used for personnel and lighter goods. At one point, I hired a truck to be on standby at the warehouse in Bidur, Nuwakot. The purpose was to be ready to move goods, if / when the roads north to Rasuwa became accessible.

In relation to one of our first distributions in Gorkha, trucks were caught on inaccessible roads on the way to a remote distribution point. Some of the drivers feared for their safety and refused to drive any further. I presented the issue for the relief team and we agreed to change the distribution plan, and to move the distribution point to a more secure location near a larger road. We experienced similar situations in Kavre District, Okhaldhunga District and Sindhupalchok District.

Demonstrations, protests and curfew

Next to the NRCS's HQ, opposite side of the operations HQ, a government institution was target for demonstrations on a regular basis. When that happened, we were banned from access to the street and we closed the warehouse. My perceptive was that demonstrators were brought to Kathmandu from other districts. Larger demonstrations and protests were going on elsewhere in Kathmandu. In these cases the police was present in the streets and driving around in the city was banned or restricted.

The situation escalated in the southern part of Nepal, which closed the roads from the Indian border to the warehouse in Bharatpur, Chitwan. For safety, we closed the warehouse for a few days, while it was on.

A couple of the planned distributions of NFRI to beneficiaries were postponed due to demonstrations and protests as well as uncertainty, if the distributions could be carried out safely and in orderly terms.

Risk assessment

Most of my input about risk issues came from delegates in the field. When this is said, I had a good relationship with the Security Delegate. We exchanged regularly information, since we lived in the same accommodation.

The Relief team made risk assessment in relation to the choice of distribution point and time. It took place in collaboration with NRCS staff from the districts and community leaders. The considerations were, whether we could use NRCS facilities, schools or other community buildings, where supplies could be locked in. Or should the distribution be done next to a mountain road, as the distance to people's homes also meant a lot. The choice should be a neutral place, that all people knew and felt safe visiting. At the same time, it was important that the Relief team, NRCS staff & volunteers and trucks with supplies as well as beneficiaries could enter and exit the distribution point in a safe manner. This is vital before, during and after a distribution. A contingency plan need be made, in case a distribution gets out of control. If none-beneficiaries disrupt the event or beneficiaries get frustrated, threatening and violent.

Security team

All incoming Red Cross personnel attended a security briefing before they were leaving Kathmandu for the field.

Information about restriction of movement for staff and delegates was sent via email and SMS-text messages by the security team.

The Security Delegate travelled around to the most affected areas to get first-hand information and make risk assessments. It was a tough task to get up-to-date information, because the situation changed much day-by-day and even hour-by-hour in the rural areas.

Means of communication

We used the following means of communication:

• face-to-face
• paper documents
• telephones 
• e-mails

We experienced power outage and a lack of network connection, but the IT/Telecom team did well to keep the network up and running. The office facilities in Kathmandu had backup generators, which meant, that we only had minor issues with lack of electricity.

Telephone coverage was fairly good throughout the country, but it could be difficult to hear and understand everything in the conversations. This was due to language barriers as well as the quality of the connection.

I received requests for distributions from NRCS and Relief team by paper documents. All my requests for trucks from transport providers were done via mobile phone and confirmation of the agreed via standardized e-mails. My communication with the warehouse delegates was done in a similar way. I did not personally experience a need to use a satellite phone, but the logistics delegates in the field had them in case of an emergency.

Whenever possible, I met face-to-face with transport providers, NRCS staff and RDRT & ERU delegates. This helped to build a personal relationship with them, and made it easier to exchange detailed and comprehensive information.

Informative maps and overviews

​New maps and overviews were more or less created every day to give NRCS staff and delegates the most reliable information covering from 'Global FACT & ERU Deployments', to 'Distribution Plan' and the whereabouts of teams and individual delegates. It seemed, that there were no restrictions on what summaries and information, that it was possible to get overviews or maps with. All in order to help people understand coherence and provide a better overview.

Identification

All Logistics Delegates were wearing official Red Cross t-shirts and/or vests, while they were working. The warehouses were equipped with large Red Cross emblems and all our own vehicles and rented cars had got sticky Red Cross emblems. Hired trucks for transportation of NFRI, WASH and ERU equipment had likewise sticky emblems whenever possible.

Lessons learned

It was vital to have up-to-date contact lists and the most reliable information of the delegate’s whereabouts. The significance, that we could get in touch with NRCS at district chapter level in order to coordinate our work, can not be underestimated.

In other emergency operations (for example, aftermaths of Typhoon in the Philippines) radio rooms are used to track & trace the Red Cross employees' movements. This setup could have been adapted to the situation in Nepal, allowing delegates, staff and volunteers to get the latest updates on road conditions and access to areas. In addition, consideration could be given to better collecting and recording of safety issues. Perhaps implementation of a system and procedure, where relevant changes to the circumstances were collected and submitted from all levels in the Red Cross community - apply for all delegates, staff, volunteers and drivers. The Logistics Cluster maintains similar data, but their information is no better, than the information they receive.

We implemented a new standard for the information on the requisition form. Information, which was delivered from the Relief team (ERU, RDRT and NRCS) to the Relief & Logistics Interface Delegate and Logistics ERU. The following information was needed for each delivery destination, beside the items and amount requested:

• GPS location
• Description of the location
• Description of the route to the location
• Name of contact(s) at location
• Phone no. to contact(s) at location
• Name of contact(s) at Relief team
• Phone no. to contact(s) at Relief team
• Which type and size of vehicles can be used
• Requested Date for the delivery
• Requested Delivery period from HH:MM to HH:MM.

It was difficult to finalize plans until the day before a shipment should be loaded at a warehouse, because of the risk for changes in the conditions and situation. Even when trucks were on the way to a destination, it could be necessary to make changes. Problems with mobile phone coverage could cause communication issues as truck drivers do not have satellite phones.