Eighteenth International Conference on Technology, Knowledge, and Society

Abstract

Most writing in communication ethics concerns what ought or ought not to be communicated. How we ought to communicate is rarely addressed–perhaps because it is rarely thought to raise any moral concerns. The present paper, however, is on the how of moral communication. It concerns, in particular, what may be called asymmetrical communication (roughly, talking “to” rather than “with” someone) and gives special attention to asymmetrical communication in social media—for that form of communication is a defining feature of social media. I argue that the use of this asymmetrical communication is not nearly so easily justified as is commonly assumed. The argument has the following structure: (i) I present a scenario in which asymmetrical, social-media-like communication takes place outside of the Internet and try to generate the intuition that there is something morally bad about it; (ii) I contend that there is no morally relevant difference between it and that same style of communication done on social media—i.e., I contend that being-on-the-internet is not a property that changes its moral status.