Sixteenth International Conference on Technology, Knowledge & Society

Abstract

In 2016, artificially intelligent (AI) lawyer Ross was hired by a New York law firm. Its first assignment was to review precedents, which was performed at an impressive rate of 100 million cases per second. In Estonia, the adjudication of small claims cases may soon be decided by artificially intelligent judges. The legal profession is only one of many examples where AI-powered agents are starting to fill the roles traditionally performed by natural persons. As we integrate AI agents into our society, how should we view the legal status of these agents? Should AI agents be viewed as persons through the eyes of the law? In exploring the answers to these questions, the corporate personhood debate has important implications for the intelligence age, and in particular, the specific question of whether AI agents (machines, ledgers, algorithms and other autonomous artificial agents) should have some of all of the rights that natural persons enjoy or be subject to some or all of the obligations to which natural persons are bound. Corporate personhood refers to the notion that corporation are legal persons and thus are entitled to some of the rights that natural persons have. Corporations have used various theories (e.g., entity theory, aggregate theory, and concession theory) to win the right to political expression, the right to own property, the right to sue, and the right to trial by jury. This paper considers to what extent these theories can and should be extended to artificial agents in our digital society.