Abstract

There is mounting evidence, both empirical and theoretical, against the common-sense conception that people hold religious beliefs. However, this discussion has so far focused on individual believers and the cognitive attitudes they hold. In this paper, I suggest the attitude that groups of people collectively hold toward religious propositions is an important phenomenon that warrants its own philosophical discussion. I propose a conception of collective religious belief under the Gilbertian joint commitment framework involving plural subjects. On the Gilbertian account, a group of people may, in her technical terms, jointly commit to believing that p as a body to give rise to the group religious belief that p. This collective belief framework explains some puzzling features of individual religious attitudes that have been noted in the cognitive science of religion and social epistemology literatures. While the cognitive science of religion, among other research programs, aims to uncover the origins of individual believers’ attitudes, the Gilbertian joint commitment account offers the best explanation for how religion functions at a communal level as well as how group beliefs influence individual cognitive attitudes and behavior.

Presenters

Tiffany Zhu
Student, Ph.D., University of California, Irvine, California, United States

Details

Presentation Type

Paper Presentation in a Themed Session

Theme

Religious Community and Socialization

KEYWORDS

Belief, Epistemology

Digital Media

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