Politically Speaking
What Are the Differences in the Impact of Religious and Moral Identity Priming on the Evaluation of Religious Ingroup and Outgroup Job Applicants?
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session Amanda ElBassiouny, Lloyd Ren Sloan
Religious and moral identities have been confounded as being the same, such that one cannot be moral without being religious and vice-versa. Based on evidence from atheists and agnostics, living a moral life doesn't require belief in religion since their morals are based on secular principles. This study investigated the distinctions between the individual/social dimensions of religious/moral identities and their consequences on the evaluation of religious ingroup/outgroup targets. Sixty-eight female Christian undergraduates’ individual/social identity and religious/moral identity were manipulated by viewing word primes. Participants examined a religious ingroup/outgroup target’s job application and evaluated likeability. The 2 (individual/social dimension) x 2 (moral/religious identity) x 2 (religious ingroup/outgroup) ANOVA revealed a main effect of moral/religious identity, which was moderated by the target’s perceived attitude towards Christians, b = .40, t(64) = 2.62, p < .05. When primed with religious identity, participants rated the target, regardless of group membership, as significantly less likeable, especially when they perceived that the target held negative views of Christians (which was the religious affiliation of all the participants). Those with a moral identity salient rated ingroup and outgroup members as more likeable, regardless of the views they held of Christians. The overall evaluation of the target is conditional in the religious identity condition, depending on the target's perceived attitude towards Christians, while it is unconditional in the moral identity condition. This is consistent with theories that moral awareness widens acceptance of others, while increasing religious outgroup awareness increases perceived distance and rejection, particularly when hostility is anticipated.
Why Did Sweden Become the First Immigration-friendly Society Among the Nordic Countries?
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session Kristian Keto
Why did Sweden become the first immigration-friendly society among the Nordic Countries? It is evident that even in quite homogenous Nordic countries global flows yield different social changes. Universalist tendencies apart this also means that Nordic societies will be more diversified. Despite a common culture, the History of Scandinavia is history of continual wars. Sweden took the leading position in Northern Europe after 1658. Old Danish territories in the north then became Swedish. Denmark then shrunk more in the 19th century, when its southern parts were ceded to Germany. Sweden’s strong position entirely ended in 1809, when its eastern parts (Finland) were ceded to Russia. Rivalry between Russia and Germany now had started in the Baltic area. While Finland (until 1809 part of Sweden) and Norway (from late middle ages part of Denmark, and union with Sweden 1814-1905) became states build on Hegelian principles and philosophy, in Sweden state philosophy was more Kantian. Hegelian philosophy also had a strong stand in Denmark, where the prevalence of ideas of revanche were more common than in Sweden. How did the Swedish parliament during the late nineteenth century see Sweden’s role in the future, and its own cultural institutions? How did those views differ from views among parliament members in other Nordic countries? This paper deals with some of the central views shared by parliament members, concerning institutions like Church, Military, and School. By tracing lines through the history to our own times we can understand attitudes towards the questions of migration.
Anti-political Correctness Gone Mad: A Foucauldian Analysis of a Hegemonic Discourse
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session Andrew Pilkington
At an earlier Interdisciplinary social sciences conference in Grenada, I deconstructed the concept of political correctness and mapped out an explanation for its emergence and increasing use by the media as an interpretive framework. A decade later, populist politicians such as Trump in the US and Farage (a key advocate of Brexit) in the UK routinely draw upon a discourse featuring political correctness as a bete noire. I adopt a Foucauldian analysis to argue in this paper that such an anti-political correctness discourse has become hegemonic. This paper critically examines the arguments mounted by critics of political correctness and argues that they are not only flawed but that they constitute an ideology which delegitimises an agenda concerned to promote equality and diversity.
