Twentieth International Conference on New Directions in the Humanities

Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether or not a reconciliation between scientific knowledge and the Kantian transcendental aesthetic can be made without resorting to the Popperian fallibilist argument. While accepting broadly that Popper’s claim that science can only assist in approximating the world beyond our senses iff such a world exists, it is also the claim of this project that the Popperian argument still relies on an existential commitment to a world beyond our senses. By asking the question, “what does science do?” I endeavor to reconsider what it is we call “science,” and what those things are for which we rely on it. In doing so, I hope to find a way to reconcile a Kantian conception of reason with the need for scientific knowledge without relying on a commitment to an approximable world beyond our senses. This is to say, science must serve some other purpose of reason than to seek knowledge of the world. It is the assertion of this thesis that science does not serve reason’s desire to seek explanation for the world, but rather that science is primarily a way by which reason measures the value of its own judgements. To highlight this point, I look to Big Data as an illustrative example of how what appears to be a means by which we attempt to account for the world proves to be more of a way by which we account for our own judgments about the world.