Fifteenth Global Studies Conference

Abstract

As Covid-19 continues to ravage the world, countries scramble to secure vaccine supplies. Within this frenzy, some countries have emerged as donors of vaccines – beyond the COVAX initiative – albeit their motivations are unlikely to be purely altruistic. Under what conditions do countries donate Covid-19 vaccines to another country? More broadly, how is the donor-recipient vaccine network structured? This paper argues that donor countries have strategic political and economic incentives to provide vaccine doses to carefully selected recipient countries. Notably, these donations not only constitute targeted diplomatic efforts in times of crisis but are also important to safeguard strategic trading partners that would in turn affect the donors. Examining a novel up-to-date dataset comprising 17822 observations across 134 countries, and leveraging the Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM), this paper finds strong support for the formation of donor-recipient ties between robust trading partners. Moreover, political homophily effects are also significant, where donor countries tend to target recipients with similar political culture and regime. However, given supply shortages, coupled with the highly targeted nature of vaccine donations, triadic closures are not salient in the network. This paper contributes to the structural analysis of Covid-19 vaccine networks through political and economic lens.