Thirteenth Global Studies Conference

Abstract

Oil-producing nations face challenging political, societal, and market driven dynamics in the near future that contribute to less control of corruption. This situation unfolds concurrently as oil prices are plummeting, thus placing a greater burden on oil-rich nations to stabilize local markets. In order to prepare for these burdens, economic and otherwise, associated with corruption risk; anti-corruption efforts are becoming a policy instrument of greater strategic importance. Existing literature focuses primarily on a nation’s quality of democratic institutions and the extent of its economic diversification as determinants of corruption. However, oil-producing nations in the Middle East that experience corruption do not consistently follow these determinants. To address this gap, I examine the effect of support for internal auditors in oil-producing nations. My hypothesis surmises that oil-producing nations with greater support for internal auditors are more likely to have greater control of corruption. Through a qualitative case study approach employing survey data and journalistic sources, I compare the cases of Bahrain and the UAE to ascertain determinants of corruption outcomes. Holding economic diversification conditions constant, I argue that corruption will vary in Bahrain and the UAE due to the extent of each nation’s support for internal auditors. Specifically, I seek to address the following research question: Why does natural resource production spur corruption in some countries but not others? My research contributes to the existing literature by introducing another determinant of corruption and assessing whether that driver conveys the variation in policy across Bahrain and the UAE.