Thirteenth Global Studies Conference

Abstract

The post-Westphalian world has been marked with ideological clashes, protests, and wars. The collapse of the League of Nations and the formation of the United Nations has led to multiple hegemons advocating democracy as a method to reduce conflict. Failure to comply with global and regional hegemons have led to foreign intervention in civil wars. Existing literature has provided an in-depth understanding of third-party intervention in the domestic affairs of a nation. These affairs range from economic policies to civil wars. A nation will intervene in another nation’s policies for strategic gains. While this has been extensively studied by scholars, existing literature fails to formulate a model to predict the payoffs and changes in results as an outcome of foreign intervention. The aim to this study to fill this exact gap. By using the deadlock game and determining the changes in payoffs, this research mathematically analyzes why rebels tend to win civil wars through foreign interventions. The implications of this paper are twofold. First, it provides a quantitative and predictive backing to existing literature and statements; and second, it enables researchers to understand the extent of disequilibrium that is required to create an impact in civil war through foreign intervention.